PABLO Q. DE
NI CRISTO, with its Executive Minister
ERANO G. MANALO, as Corporation
Sole, represented by its
Attorney-in-fact,
RESTITUTO S. LAZARO,
Petitioners, Present:
Panganiban, C.J.
(Chairperson),
-
versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
JOSEFINA BALINAG and
SPS.
EMMANUEL DIAZ &
NELLIE DIAZ,
Respondents. Promulgated:
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69135 dated
The following are the antecedent
facts:
On February 28, 2000, petitioners Pablo Q. De Leon and Iglesia ni Cristo
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of second deed of sale of same
property with damages[4]
against respondents Josefina Balinag and spouses Emmanuel and Nellie Diaz
before the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1006
and raffled to Branch 35.
Petitioners alleged that on
A PARCEL OF LAND situated in the
Barrio of Calutitt, Mun. of Bontoc, Mt. Province and bounded on the N., by {Lot
11} 4277 Bontoc site; on the E., by National Road; on the S., by creek and on
the W., by Municipal Road and Lot 7-1 {Psu-985} and containing an area of ONE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY TWO {1,652} square meters, more or less, covered by
Tax Declaration No. 5576 of the Local Assessor’s Office of Bontoc, Mt. Province
with an assessed value of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).[5]
The said land
had been leased to petitioners from
According to petitioners, however, respondent Balinag, in utter bad faith,
sold 1,162 square meters of the same property to the respondent spouses Diaz on
On
Respondents likewise alleged that
petitioners had filed another action for quieting of title, declaration of
nullity of second deed of sale, recovery of possession, damages with injunction
before the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province docketed as Civil Case
No. 795 (second action) and entitled Pablo Q. De Leon, represented by
Rodrigo Cadaoas v. Spouses Emmanuel and Nellie Diaz, Josefina Balinag, and
Herman A. Lunsad, as Provincial Assessor of Mountain Province.[11]
This case, which was raffled to Branch
35 of the same court, involved 1,162 square meters of the same property and was
anchored on the same Deed of Absolute Sale dated
Respondents also pointed out that the
order dismissing the second action was assailed by petitioners through a
petition for certiorari filed and docketed as G.R. No. 109556 before the
Supreme Court.[13] The petition, which was treated as one filed
under Rule 45, was denied on
Moreover, respondent spouses Diaz averred
that petitioners have no cause of action against them considering that petitioner
Iglesia Ni Kristo’s church does not stand within their property but on a parcel
of land which belonged to Peter Avelino G. Balinag. In fact, the latter filed Civil Case No. 374 for
recovery of possession with damages entitled Peter Avelino Balinag v.
Iglesia ni Kristo,[16]
which case is now pending before the Municipal Trial Court of Bontoc,
On
Petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, on
Petitioners insist that the principle of res judicata should not
apply in the instant case since there was no judgment on the merits in the two
prior actions. They assert that if the
rule on res judicata should apply, the same must be applied liberally in
the interest of substantial justice.
We find merit in the petition.
The prevailing circumstances of the
instant case compel us to suspend the procedural rules in order that the true
merits of the parties’ claims and defenses may be ventilated in a full-blown
trial. Indeed, if viewed purely as a
procedural matter, the instant case should be deemed as barred by prior
judgment. However, the rule on res
judicata may give way to the higher interest of justice, as we now find in
the instant case.
We note that the two prior actions
which supposedly preclude the present case never reached the trial stage and
were in fact dismissed upon motion of respondent spouses Diaz. The first action was dismissed when petitioner
De Leon was declared non-suited by the trial court, while the second action
suffered a similar fate due to res judicata by virtue of the dismissal
of the first action. Although petitioner
sought to question the dismissal of the second action through a petition filed
before the Supreme Court, we dismissed the same on the ground of late filing
and payment of docket fees.
However, an examination of the
complaints in the first and second actions reveals that the former could not
have operated as res judicata on the latter. The first action, which was denominated as one
for “Injunction with Restraining Order” is actually a case for forcible entry
filed by petitioner De Leon against respondent spouses Diaz. In that case, petitioner De Leon alleged:
4. That way back
on
x x x x
which
property is presently being used for religious worship by the congregation of
the Iglesia ni Kristo;
5. That the sale
of the above-described property is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “B”;
6. That on or
about February 9, 1991, defendants started constructing a septic tank by
digging or excavating within the above-described property some fifteen (15)
meters away from the doorstep of the chapel; and despite the protestation of
herein plaintiff, pleading with them to desist from performing their illegal
acts, said defendants continued digging and as of the preparation of this
complaint, the excavation is now about six (6) feet deep and two (2) meters
wide; x x x
7. That the
commission or continuance of the acts complained of would work injustice to the
plaintiff;
x x x x[22]
and that
consequently, petitioner De Leon prayed for the trial court:
1. To issue a
restraining order upon the filing of this complaint;
2. To issue a
permanent injunctive writ after trial;
3. To direct
the defendants to remove all the illegal construction they have made on subject
property at their own expense;
x x x x[23]
Thus, the first action was filed by
petitioner De Leon to restrain the respondent spouses Diaz from disturbing his
peaceful possession and occupation of the disputed lot. The deed of sale in favor of petitioner De
Leon was mentioned in the complaint only to establish his right of possession
over the property, which is ownership by virtue of said deed. No mention was made of the second sale of the
same property to the respondent spouses Diaz. Therefore, the first action was a case for
forcible entry.
In contrast, the second action filed
by petitioner De Leon was one for the declaration of nullity of the second deed
of sale. While the second complaint also
alleged the acts of forcible entry complained of in the first action, the
second complaint basically assailed the legality of said double sale by
alleging:
x
x x x
4. That on July 8, 1991, defendant Josefina Balinag, in utter bad faith and with malice aforethought, again executed a deed of sale for the same property, or a substantial portion thereof, in favor of defendant-spouses and despite the latter’s knowledge of the previous sale and prior occupancy thereof by the plaintiff, allegedly paid P260,000.00 for it x x x.
5. That
defendant-spouses, even before the sale in question, started harassing the
plaintiff by digging the premises some fifteen (15) meters away from the
doorsteps of the Iglesia Ni Cristo chapel thereat, erected with the permission
of the plaintiff; and lately, after the sale the same defendant-spouses
deposited sand and gravel, cement, lumber and other construction materials in
order to overrun the premises in question, threatening to dislodge plaintiff
and his tenants/agents from their prior possession of the land, despite their
vigorous protest.
x
x x x[24]
Petitioner De
a. To issue a
permanent injunction after trial.
b. To declare
as null and void and of no effect the second deed of sale executed by defendant
Josefina Balinag in favor of herein defendant-spouses.
c. Consequently,
to uphold the first deed of sale made in favor of plaintiff, declaring him the
legitimate owner and legal possessor of the land in dispute.
x
x x x[25]
Thus, the second action should not have been dismissed on the ground of res
judicata. The cause of action and the relief prayed for
in the two cases are not identical although the parties are undoubtedly the
same. Moreover, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the first
action which was a case for forcible entry. Consequently, the dismissal of the first
action should not have operated at all as a bar to the second action.
However, in availing of a remedy against the dismissal of the second
action, petitioners belatedly filed a petition before the Supreme Court which was
dismissed without resolving on the merits. Petitioners thus find themselves now with no
recourse except to appeal to our sense of justice and equity.
In Teodoro v. Carague,[26] we held that it is within the inherent power
and discretion of the Court to amend, modify or reconsider a final judgment
when it is necessary to accomplish the administration of justice. This is especially true when technicalities
have overtaken the resolution of substantial issues, thus preventing the
parties from presenting the merits of their respective claims and defenses. Thus, the public policy underlying the
principle of res judicata must be considered together with the policy
that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which to
present his case.[27] After all, rules of procedure are intended to
promote rather than defeat substantial justice, and should thus not be applied
in a very rigid and technical sense.
In the instant case, the issue of alleged double sale of the same
property to petitioners and respondent spouses Diaz was never resolved on the
merits. The two prior actions were
thrown out due to procedural infirmities that had no bearing on the substantive
matters raised by the parties. While it
would seem that the dismissal of the petition pertaining to the second action
should preclude the courts from entertaining petitioners’ third action on the
principle of res judicata, we could nonetheless disregard the latter,
which is a procedural rule, if its application would involve the sacrifice of
justice to technicality.
In resolving the present case in petitioners’ favor, we note that they have
been in possession of the property in question for many years and have built
thereon a house of worship as well as residences for their ministers.
Petitioners have presented a deed of sale which appears to have been regularly
signed by respondent Balinag, as seller, who presumably received substantial
consideration for the property. We
cannot turn a blind eye to these facts even as, procedurally, petitioners’
claim may have been barred. To our mind, it would be more in keeping with the
standards of fairness to allow petitioners the opportunity to fully
substantiate their claim in a full-blown trial.
The broader interest of justice as well as the circumstances of the instant
case justifies the relaxation of the rule on res judicata. The Court is not precluded from re-examining
its own ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn
adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to
technicality. This is not the first time
that the principle of res judicata has been set aside in favor of
substantial justice, which is after all the avowed purpose of all law and
jurisprudence.[28] At the very least, therefore, petitioners must
be afforded the chance to legitimately prove their claim.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 69135 dated May 31, 2005 which affirmed in toto the Order
of the Regional Trial Court of Bontoc,
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 53-65. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina
Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and
Fernanda Lampas Peralta.
[2]
[3]
[4]
Records, pp. 1-6.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Rollo in G.R. No. 109556, p. 98.
[15]
[16]
Records, pp. 11-16.
[17] Rollo, p. 124.
[18]
[19]
[20] Rollo, pp. 53-64.
[21]
[22] Records, pp. 40-41.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
G.R. No. 96004, February 21, 1992, 206 SCRA 429.
[27]
[28]